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SPEECHES
The Current Situation in Nicaragua: A
Speech by Dr. Sergio Ramirez, Former
Vice-President of Nicaragua*
ROBERT W. BENSON:** Dr. Sergio Ramirez attended law school in
Nicaragua in the 1960s, at a time when the Somoza dictatorship, with
the support of the United States government, controlled the Nicara-
guan government in service of itself and a small privileged class.
Dr. Ramirez' first love was literature. By the early 1970s, he had
produced several volumes of short stories. However, in Latin
America, unlike the United States, commitment to literature does not
mean alienation from political life. Despite being born to a privileged
family, Ramirez joined the Sandinista Front in 1975. The Sandinista
revolutionary movement eventually overthrew the Somoza dictator-
ship on July 19, 1979.
Dr. Ramirez was chosen as a member of the first Governing
Junta of National Reconstruction and was elected vice-president
under Daniel Ortega in the first democratic elections, held in Nicara-
gua in 1984. He served as vice-president until the Sandinista party
lost the February 1990 election to the opposition coalition ("UNO"),
led by Violeta Chamorro. Presently, Dr. Ramirez holds an alternate's
seat in the National Assembly and is the leader of the Sandinista dele-
gation in that assembly. He continues to be a prolific essayist on the
theory of the Sandinista revolution and the thought of Sandino.
Dr. Ramirez, I would like you to know that you and your party
have the continuing support of your many admirers here in the
United States. We applaud your many accomplishments during ten
years of government service, particularly your role in establishing a
democratic government in Nicaragua for the first time in its history.
Please join me in welcoming my friend Dr. Sergio Ramirez.
DR. SERGIO RAMIREZ: I am very pleased to be here in the United
* On September 13, 1990, Dr. Sergio Ramirez addressed a group of students and
faculty at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, California.
** Robert W. Benson is a Professor of Law at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles,
California.
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States. We, the Sandinistas, will always be deeply indebted to the peo-
ple of the United States, especially those in the academic community
who have supported our organization for many years.
Rather than make a lengthy speech, I would like to begin with a
short monologue and use the remaining time to answer questions you
may have regarding the current situation in Nicaragua, especially
those pertaining to the Constitution and the relationship between the
government of Nicaragua and our students.
As you may know, the Nicaraguan Constitution was established
in 1987.' The National Assembly approved the Constitution only af-
ter a very long period of public consultation among different sectors
of Nicaraguan society. The framers considered many opinions in Nic-
aragua before approving the final draft. This Constitution, like many
others in Latin America, has two main parts. The first part guaran-
tees to all individuals freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and all
other human rights considered to be fundamental in a democratic so-
ciety.2 The second part of the Constitution organizes the newer divi-
sions of power of the state of Nicaragua under the revolution.
3
The Constitution embodies all the economic, social, and political
transformations that have occurred since the beginning of the revolu-
tion. For example, the Constitution calls for nonalignment with inter-
national powers in an effort to gain independence from external
influence, which was one of the objectives of the 1979 revolution.
4
The Constitution also creates a system of political pluralism in which
all sectors of society are able to freely participate in government.5
This was most obviously demonstrated in the democratic electoral
system under which this year's elections were held. Finally, the Con-
stitution calls for a mixed economy comprised of both private and
public sectors.
6
1. NICARAGUA CONST., reprinted in Caldera, The Rule of Law in the Nicaraguan
Revolution, 12 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 345, 469 (1990).
2. Id. arts. 23-128, at 475-95.
3. Id. arts. 129-95, at 495-511 (primarily establishing the separate branches of govern-
ment-legislative, executive, judicial, and electoral-and establishing municipalities).
4. Id. art. 5, 4, at 471.
5. Id. art. 5, 2, at 471. "Political pluralism assures the existence and participation of
all political organizations in the economic, political and social affairs of the nation, without
ideological restrictions, except for those who seek a return to the past or advocate the estab-
lishment of a political system similar to it." Id.
6. Id. art. 5, 3, at 471. "[T]hese [mixed] forms of property must serve the best inter-
ests of the nation and contribute to the creation of wealth to satisy the needs of the country
and its inhabitants." Id.
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I would like to diverge momentarily to discuss some important
things about the revolution in Nicaragua that I feel are imperative.
First, I will address the establishment of democracy in Nicaragua. It
is not an overstatement to say that the most important objective of
our revolution in Nicaragua is to foster democracy. Democracy is
imperative because revolutions and the fear of civil war almost always
result from one-party, closed political systems. Although political
parties were established in Nicaragua at the beginning of the revolu-
tion, we did not have the opportunity to establish a pure democratic
system at that time because of external pressures on the revolutionary
government. There was a serious war in progress, and, as a result, the
development of the revolution was suffering many setbacks and
delays.
In 1984, we did hold free elections. However, because the
Sandinistas administered those elections, many political parties that
were involved with the reorganization of the democratic government
did not participate. In addition, the United States government did
not recognize the legitimacy of the results of the 1984 elections. Nev-
ertheless, democracy has now been established in Nicaragua. This
was confirmed by the 1984 elections and by the 1987 Constitution.
The only meaningful way in which the Sandinistas could demonstrate
their commitment to legitimate democracy was to have periodic elec-
tions. Thus, we held the 1990 elections in accordance with the Nica-
raguan Constitution.7
We did not hesitate for one moment to accept elections as a basic
principle of democracy. We have accepted the results of the 1990
elections, even though we lost. Of course, that loss surprised us all,
even Mrs. Chamorro. The defeat affected everyone in the Sandinista
party. Nevertheless, we recognized that our first responsibility after
the election was to calmly participate in the orderly transition of the
government in a very unusual situation. This marked the first time in
the history of Nicaragua, particularly during the last 150 years of re-
publican government, that power had passed from one body to an-
other by way of an election. In the past, Nicaraguan governments
were overthrown or removed by force. The passage of power from
one party to another was a new and unique challenge that brought
completely new and different ideological ideas into Nicaragua. This
7. See id. arts. 168-74 (describing the duties and responsibilities of the electoral branch
charged with conducting elections).
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challenge required a great deal of preparation, which was primarily
the responsibility of the Sandinista party.
The transition agreement8 that the Sandinistas and the new gov-
ernment signed on March 23, 1990, had three main objectives. First,
the counter-revolutionary forces ("Contras") were to immediately be
disarmed and demobilized. The Sandinistas recognized, when they
accepted the results of the election, that the Contras were still present
and continued to be supported by the United States government. Sec-
ond, the Nicaraguan army and security forces were to remain under
their own control and supervision as independent organizations.
Third, the new government was to respect all social and economic
transformations which had occurred throughout the last ten years of
the revolution.
The first goal of the transition agreement, disarming and demo-
bilizing the Contras, has already been accomplished. This was the
single most important accomplishment during the transition period.
It was absolutely imperative that the Contras be disarmed and dis-
banded. Today, the Contras exist only in the countryside and are a
social and economic problem for the new government. However, they
are no longer a military threat to the stability of the government. We
can now say that the country is stable.
The second goal of the transition agreement, to maintain control
of the army, has also been achieved. All Nicaraguans realize that the
army was created as a result of the Sandinista revolution and that the
guerrilla chieftains of the insurrection against Somoza were trans-
ferred to the army. However, both the Sandinistas and the new gov-
ernment have accepted the transition agreement with the
understanding that the army will become an institutional body, rather
than an armed body identified with the Sandinista party. The mili-
tary's actions will be consistent with the interests of the nation of Nic-
aragua. However, all of the leaders of the army, including General
Ortega, will remain in their respective positions.
The third goal of the transition agreement, relating to the trans-
formation of the economic and social structure of the country, was
the most conflicting and dramatic. Although the new government
agreed to respect the transformation of the last ten years, it has its
own political agenda and its own political mind. The new govern-
8. See Boudreaux, Contras to Start Giving Up Arms and Disbanding, L.A. Times, Mar.
24, 1990, at Al, col. 4; Boudreaux, Most Contras to Keep Arms, Leader Says, L.A. Times, Mar.
25, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
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ment believes that privatization of public properties will solve the eco-
nomic problems of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas disagree. The new
government believes that it is necessary to return Nicaragua to the
hands of the old Somoza families who have been living in Miami dur-
ing the last ten years. The new government wants to bring them back
to the country and return to them all the property they lost as a result
of the revolution. The Sandinistas strongly believe that this would
endanger the social and economic future of the nation and would be
contrary to the provisions of the Nicaraguan Constitution.
There is also a conflict of interest issue which arises in defining
the public or private identity of future businesses. We cannot subvert
our constitutional principles in the name of economic stability. We
cannot be certain privatization alone will create economic stability.
Neither can we be secure in assuming that economic stability alone
will solve all of the country's social and economic problems.
The Sandinistas are now an unarmed civilian party. We will
compete for power under the terms of the Nicaraguan Constitution-
the Sandinista Constitution. Under its terms, Nicaraguan society was
able to elect a party other than the Sandinista Front, and we will re-
spect this. We now must be satisfied to wait for the next participatory
elections. Meanwhile, we are preparing to serve as a real democratic
political party, capable of participating in and influencing the gov-
erning of the country.
At this time I would like to answer your questions.
QUESTION: Would you comment on the role that the Nicaraguan
Supreme Court has in resolving the conflicts that you spoke of. I un-
derstand that the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional one of
the first decree laws that was issued by the Chamorro government-a
civil service law. Is the Supreme Court an adequate instrument to re-
solve these conflicts?
RAMIREZ: During the first weeks of the Chamorro government, Mrs.
Chamorro really had little to do with the government's affairs. In-
stead, they were under the control of Mr. Antonio Lacayo, the Minis-
ter for the Presidency. He is the real "prime minister" of the country.
During the first weeks, they began governing under a different
ideological design than that which we established in 1979. They gov-
erned Nicaragua by decree law. In my view, this was a mistake, be-
cause they ignored the fact that Nicaragua already had a constitution
and a body of laws. They did this because it was easier for the new
1991]
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administration to govern by law decrees, rather than sending laws
through the National Assembly, which continues to be controlled by
a Sandinista majority. The National Assembly does not favor the new
government because the original coalition that brought Mrs.
Chamorro to power is now split into two factions. One faction is led
by Mr. Alfredo Cesar, who represents the interests of Mr. Lacayo and
Mrs. Chamorro. The other faction favors the interests of Virgilio
Godoy, the Vice-President of the Republic. Although they govern
together, these two groups are politically opposed to each other in
many ways. National Assembly members sometimes support the in-
terests of Mrs. Chamorro for a period of time and then switch to ac-
commodate the interests of Mr. Godoy.
Mrs. Chamorro's failure to gain a consensus in the National As-
sembly prompted her to begin governing through law decrees, which
are in many cases unconstitutional. Ordinary laws passed by a vote of
the National Assembly can only be amended by the National Assem-
bly itself. Law decrees or simple decrees have, of course, a lower sta-
tus in the legal structure of the Constitution and simply cannot
supersede laws passed by the National Assembly.
The Supreme Court has received many complaints about these
law decrees. It has already resolved a complaint over the reformation
of the law protecting civil servants. The new government passed a
law decree reforming an ordinary law that protects civil servants.
The Supreme Court held the law decree unconstitutional and restored
all the rights of the civil servants which were suppressed by the law
decree.
There are other complaints presently before the Supreme Court
which will be resolved in the near future. For example, one law de-
cree ordered the National Assembly to form an administrative com-
mission to determine the property reclamation demands of the old
Somoza families who emigrated to Miami ten years ago and now want
to return to Nicaragua. This law decree gives the administrative com-
mission the faculties of an ordinary lower court. We challenged this
decree before the Supreme Court because an administrative commis-
sion cannot substitute for an ordinary court under the terms of the
Constitution. This issue will be resolved in the next few weeks. There
are many others like it.
QUESTION: What is the status of the International Court of Justice's
decision regarding United States mining of Nicaraguan harbors? Has
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there been some agreement by which Nicaragua would be paid dam-
ages for that action?
RAMIREZ: In 1986, the International Court of Justice ordered the
United States government to cease mining Nicaraguan harbors.9 Ad-
ditionally, the court ordered the United States to pay Nicaragua for
the damage caused by its role in the war. The calculation of compen-
sation is now under consideration.
Before the change of government in Nicaragua, the National As-
sembly passed a law that declared this decision of the International
Court to be a national priority. The present Nicaraguan government
cannot negotiate any settlement with the United States that does not
comply with the terms of this law. The United States government is
currently attempting to persuade the Chamorro government to stop
the enforcement of this law. However, this will be impossible because
of the many pressures on the new government.
One reason why the United States has failed to meet its commit-
ment to give an enormous amount of aid to the Chamorro govern-
ment (aid that is desperately needed in Nicaragua today) is to
pressure the Chamorro government into a favorable settlement of this
International Court case. Another rumor circulating is that the
United States is negotiating for Nicaragua to drop its case before the
International Court because the Bush Administration is planning to
introduce to the court a case against Iraq.
QUESTION: The new government is dealing with a body of law created
by a National Assembly that did not originate and evolve from usual
democratic processes. It is your position that the National Assembly,
the Supreme Court, and the laws that existed prior to the change in
government should remain in place. What is the policy of the
Chamorro government, which was democratically elected by the people
and is hopefully responsive to the electorate, towards continuing to gov-
ern under the 1987 Constitution and the laws enacted thereunder?
RAMIREZ: I do not accuse the Chamorro government of being a fas-
cist government. I admit that there have been some cases. However,
I believe that it is not the will of the Chamorro government to develop
a new constitution and to discard all the existing laws and procedures.
There is always the temptation of converting the government by fas-
9. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, 1986
I.C.J. 14.
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cist procedures. In Latin American countries it is easier and more
expedient for a government to act without the constraints of a written
constitution. However, I believe that the political and social forces of
Nicaraguan society will pave the way for the institutionalization of
the country.
A classic division of powers between the Supreme Court, the Na-
tional Assembly, the executive power, and now the electoral power
will occur so that each can function independently. Stability is an
important factor in the consolidation and independence of these pub-
lic institutions. In spite of the fact that the Sandinistas are a revolu-
tionary party, we have a commitment to consolidate democracy in
Nicaragua, because democracy is guaranteed only by laws set forth in
the Constitution. Admittedly, there are some sectors of Nicaraguan
society, as well as some factions in the government, that simply
wanted the Sandinista Front to disappear from the political scene fol-
lowing our 1990 electoral defeat. Our primary defense against this is
to consolidate the democratic institutions in Nicaragua. These are the
same democratic institutions that the Sandinistas created and which
will allow the Sandinistas to maintain influence and power in Nicara-
guan government.
QUESTION: During a recent visit to Nicaragua in July 1990, I stayed
with some Sandinistas, in Ciudad Sandino, who told me: "We are very
heavily armed-everybody in our barrio has a weapon. " I also heard
numerous stories about civilian supporters of the Chamorro government
carrying arms. In light of the statement you made here today that the
Sandinistas are a civilian party, and not an armed party, can you
please comment on the proliferation of arms in Nicaragua? How signif-
icant a threat is it to the democratic process?
RAMIREZ: It is important to remember that during the height of the
war from 1985 to 1987, more than one hundred thousand men carried
arms in Nicaragua. This is a very high figure for a small country of
only three to four million people. Moreover, this number refers to
ordinary common people carrying arms and does not include the reg-
ular army. One reason for this high number is that it is legal for
civilians to bear arms in many parts of Managua. In addition, soldiers
often brought their arms back to their homes after completing their
two-year draft term. Thus, after the elections and before the Contras
were disarmed, there were thousands of guns in Nicaragua.
When the second strike occurred in June 1990, there was a real
544 t'Vol. 13:537
Current Situation in Nicaragua
threat of civil war. There were Sandinistas in barricades with arms
and supporters of the Chamorro government with arms. In addition,
members of the Contras came to Managua from the countryside to
support the government. Fearing civil war, the army and the police
began disarming everyone in the country. A new rule was enacted
allowing only the police and the army to carry weapons. As a result,
the government has confiscated thousands of weapons from civilians.
There has been little resistance to this action in Managua because the
people realize it is necessary to avoid the very real danger of a civil
war in Nicaragua.
We must begin to condition our nation to accept the idea that all
problems can and should be solved through the political process-not
with arms.
QUESTION: You described the Contras as a social and economic prob-
lem in Nicaragua. Does the Sandinista party have a position in the
National Assembly on how to absorb, resettle, or deal with the Contras
now that they are demobilized?
RAMIREZ: The process of resettling the Contras is quite difficult.
There were almost twenty thousand Contras who turned in their
arms. This is a lot of people, especially when you consider that many
of them have children and families. The Nicaraguan government
made the commitment to establish what they call Contra Develop-
ment Poles in different regions of the country where the Contras were
operating. The United States committed to give the government
about $55 million to help settle the Contra forces. However, the gov-
ernment of Nicaragua has yet to receive this money from the United
States. Without it, our government really has no chance of properly
settling all of these people.
In addition to the enormous problem of dealing with the Contra
forces and their families, there is also a major problem dealing with
the poor peasants in the country. These people have not worked in a
long time and are without food. To make things worse, Nicaragua is
in the middle of a tremendous drought; the worst drought in the last
ten years. Thus, there is no food in the countryside and no way to
obtain food for the remainder of the year. This is obviously affecting
all of the peasant families. We are now in a critical situation. All the
economic measures that the government has taken using the new lib-
eral national monetary policy are currently creating a desperate situa-
tion. Deprivation, hyper-inflation, recession, unemployment-all of
1991]
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these are part of the problem. There is the real possibility of social
upheaval-not caused by political forces or the Sandinista Front, but
by the whole social and economic situation. It may very well explode.
QUESTION: You said that the Sandinista party stated in its addresses
to the National Assembly that it does not believe in privatization. What
do you see as the answer to Nicaragua's economic problems?
RAMIREZ: The solution to Nicaragua's economic problem is not
privatization. Privatization is an ideological solution. Real problems
cannot be solved through ideological solutions. We, the Sandinistas,
also cannot be ideological in this sense. We cannot oppose privatiza-
tion solely on so-called ideological principles.
I think Nicaragua first needs economic stability. Economic sta-
bility is needed to put an end to hyper-inflation and to create a general
atmosphere of stability in the country. This would create employ-
ment opportunities and facilitate foreign investment in the country. If
it is necessary to turn over an enterprise to private hands, I am not
opposed to it. However, private enterprises must be owned by per-
sons who can bring resources and new investment capital into the
country in order to create and stimulate economic activity. But to put
enterprises into the hands of individuals who have been living in
Miami for the last ten years, who have no continuing commitment to
long-term investment in Nicaragua, would be imprudent. This would
resurrect social conflict in the country because it would involve re-
turning enterprises and properties to the hands of the Somoza family
and people in the old Somoza dictatorship. It would create a serious
polarization of opinion in Nicaragua. Thus, the only answer we can
see is to stabilize the economic situation in Nicaragua and bring eco-
nomic development into the country. Of course, there are people
within the Sandinista party who see privatization as a political matter.
They radically oppose any sort of privatization policy by the new
government.
QUESTION: The Nicaraguan economy is suffering from simultaneous
inflation and recession. Many people believe that the huge civil service
machinery created by the former Sandinista government is overburden-
ing the economy. Perhaps such a large civil service was necessary dur-
ing wartime, but it is certainly burdening the country at the moment.
In light of recent labor strikes, is the Sandinista party willing or plan-
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ning to help ease the burden on the economy by compromising on this
issue?
RAMIREZ: The real problem you are identifying is that Nicaragua is a
very poor country. To illustrate, divide the Nicaraguan government
into three sections: education, health, and "other sectors." To reduce
the public budget and alleviate this situation, cuts must be made in
education and health. Making cuts in "other sectors" would yield
insignificant results. Unfortunately, cutting back on education and
health is not easy. There are approximately fifty thousand teachers
and about fifty thousand health workers in Nicaragua. Making cuts
would obliterate the education and health service systems. For exam-
ple, last week the Chamorro government cut all university budgets by
twenty percent in an effort to relieve the budget problem. As a result,
students and teachers protested in the streets.
We must also consider the army and the police. The army has
been cut by fifty percent. However, there are ten thousand men in the
Nicaraguan police forces. The national budget deficit is a very diffi-
cult problem to solve. I understand the problems of the new govern-
ment because I had to deal with those problems over the last ten
years.
The real problem in Nicaragua is not public expenditure, but the
lack of external aid. I recall President Bush saying during the electo-
ral campaign that if Mrs. Chamorro was victorious, the United States
would give economic support to the new government. On the other
hand, if the Sandinistas won, the war would continue, the embargo
would not be lifted, and conscription would continue in Nicaragua.
This is one of the main reasons the Sandinistas lost the election.
Since the elections, what has happened? The United States Con-
gress has approved $300 million in aid for this year, and $200 million
for 1991. However, to date, the Nicaraguan government has only re-
ceived $60 million, an amount barely sufficient to cover the apportion
for health service workers. That alone was $45 million. The
problems in Nicaragua cannot be solved with $200 million. It will
require $1 billion over two or three years. Furthermore, some West-
ern European nations which had previously supported the Sandinista
government, have cut back on aid, presumably reasoning that since
Chamorro was elected, Nicaragua is now the problem of the United
States.
QUESTION: With respect to revitalizing the Nicaraguan economy, do
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you seek American and foreign investments, and what type of invest-
ments or joint ventures do you support?
RAMIREZ: I cannot speak for Mrs. Chamorro and the present gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. However, the Sandinista Front believes that
Nicaragua should be open to external investment and industry. We
approved a very modern law to attract foreign investments. Of
course, the economic conditions for investment in Nicaragua were
very different during the war. The Sandinistas believe that foreign
investment is necessary for Nicaragua's economy to grow. Further, it
is necessary for Nicaraguans who removed their capital from the
country during the war to be allowed to return and reinvest their capi-
tal. What the country needs is economic revitalization. We are not
going to survive politically or ideologically without economic recrea-
tion. We do not want an economically stagnant country. Revolution
means change. Revolution means creating better conditions for the
people. Without improving conditions for people, revolutions are
useless.
QUESTION: Nicaragua's Constitution enumerates a great deal of social
and economic rights; many more in fact, than the United States Consti-
tution. Are these rights a reality, and who protects these rights? Are
these social and economic rights being realized by the people of
Nicaragua?
RAMIREZ: Well, the problem is the condition of the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment in relation to what we call social and economic transforma-
tions. Through the revolution and its system of laws, these
transformations created the basis for a new society. Of course, the
creation of that society in Nicaragua is not yet complete. Again, Nic-
aragua is a very poor country, but we have laid the foundation for the
development of a new society.
Transformations are necessary in all Latin American cultures
which have very traditional social and economic structures. For ex-
ample, in Nicaragua, land reform is one of the milestones of the
revolution. We returned land to families in the countryside. One
hundred thousand families received thirty-million acres of land. In
the last ten years, we offered one hundred thousand land sites. Thus,
in a sense, we introduced the idea of private property to Nicaragua.
We increased the number of Nicaraguans in schools to one mil-
lion out of a population of about four million. One million Ni-
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caraguans are now in school; this is a radical transformation.
Everyone now has an opportunity to be educated. Of course, the
quality of education and material conditions are still affected by our
financial problems. Nevertheless, people have the opportunity to at-
tend universities, as well as technical and primary schools. The
Sandinista education campaign reduced illiteracy from seventy per-
cent to twelve percent. This is also a real transformation of the struc-
ture of Nicaraguan society. We now have the base to begin working
toward building a new Nicaraguan society.

